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The Challenge of Deflation:  
policy choices and their effectiveness 
 
Ligang Song 
 
Challenges of deflation 
 
With an average annual growth rate of about 9 per cent during the past two decades, 
China has become the seventh largest economy and the eleventh larg st trading nation 
in the world by 1998. It has been one of the largest foreign capital recipients in the 
world since the mid 1990s. It has the second largest size of international reserves next 
only to Japan at present (US$151.5 billion by the end of Sept mber 1999). Recently, 
China has weathered the storm of the East Asian crisis erupted in 1997 making an 
important contribution to the stability and later the recovery of the East Asian 
economy from this unprecedented crisis in the region.  
 
Domestically, after 20 years of its endeavour on the reform path, China is facing a 
‘diminishing return’ to reform after it began to tackle the hardest part of its economic 
system under the reform program, namely the reform of the state-owned n erprises in 
relation to restructuring of the state-own d banks. In this process, a new phenomenon 
has begun to merge in the economy in recent years, that is price deflation, which is 
partly due to the partially reformed economic system and partly due to the current 
irrational or imperfect economic structure.  
 
A partially reformed economic system and new reform measures aimed at deepening 
the reform bring about uncertainties among residents. With uncertainties associated 
with various reform programs such as housing, pension, health and education, residents 
continue to increase savings at the expense of consumption. To the extent that the 
changes in consumption reduce demand for domestic products, domestic prices will 
tend to fall. 
 
On the other hand, the irrational or imperfect economic structure leads to the 
continued inefficient production of many unwanted products causing the problems of 
over-capacities of production and over-supply of goods. The lack of domestic effective 
demand and over-supply of products in the domestic market are th  fundamental 
causes for the current price deflation.  
 
Other factors, which have contributed the current price deflation, are the 
implementation of the relatively tight monetary policy in the mid 1990s and the 
weakening of China’s external economy due to the erosion of the competitiveness of 
China’s exports by the currency depreciation in other East Asian economies.  
 
It can be argued that a shift from a seller’s market to a buyer’s market taking place in 
recent years, without at the same time making substantial progress in resolving the 
institutional and structural problems, will be likely to trigger price deflation, unless the 
external economy is strong enough to offset the deflationary pressure in the domestic 
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economy or government expansionary policies are effective to boost domestic 
investment and demand. Since it takes time for the reform measures to be effective in 
order to reduce uncertainties, the government has no other choices but to rely on its 
macroeconomic policy instruments to boost theec nomy.  
 
Table 1. Macroeconomic indicators, 1995-99 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999* 
Real GDP (% real change) 10.5 9.5 8.8 7.8 7.4 (1-9) 
Gross industrial output (% real change) 20.3 16.6 13.1 8.9 9.5 (1-5) 
Inflation (retail price % change) 14.8 6.1 0.8 -2.6 -3.0 (1-9) 
Growth of M2 broad money supply (%) 29.5 25.3 19.6 14.8 17.2 (May) 
Exchange rate (RMB/US$) 8.32 8.30 8.28 8.28 8.27 (Sept) 
Fixed asset investment (% nominal change) 13.3 10.6 9.0 14.1 13.5 (1-5) 
Retail sales (% nominal change) 26.8 20.1 10.2 6.8 6.4 (1-9) 
Exports (% changes in $) 23.0 1.5 21.0 0.5 2.1 (1-9) 
Imports (% change in $) 14.2 5.1 2.5 -1.5 19.3 (1-9) 
Merchandise trade balance ($ billion) 16.7 12.2 40.3 43.6   19.4 (1-9) 
Note: * Figures for 1999 are from various newly published sources such as the People’s 
Daily. 
Sources: State Statistics Bureau, Chinese Statistical Yearbook 1998 and various other 
sources for the latest figures. 
 
To implement the expansionary monetary policy, the central bank has reduced interest 
rates seven times over the past three years, reducing the one-year loan rate from about 
10 per cent in 1996 to around 3 per cent in June 1999. The central bank also lowered 
the bank reserve ratio from 12 to 8 per cent to boost banking lending. 
 
On the fiscal front, the gov rnment issued 100 billion yuan (US$12.8 billion) special 
bonds in the second half of 1998 to invest in infrastructure projects to boost the 
economy. With domestic demand showing no signs of recovery in the first half of 
1999, the government declared it would step up its active policy and issue more 
treasury bonds of 60 billion yuan (US$7.25 billion) in the second half of this year to 
offset deflationary pressures. Of the new package, 30 billion yuan (US$3.63 bln) will 
be included in this year's central government budget, increasing the deficit to 180.3 
billion yuan (US$21.80 bln). The other 30 billion yuan (US$3.63 bln) will be raised by 
the central government on behalf of the local governments, and will not be included in 
the central budget. The spending will focus on four areas: infrastructure construction, 
upgrading China's industrial base, improving China's environment and cultural projects. 
 
By September 1999, being unable to generate evident increases in investments by the 
non-state sector, China still rel es heavily on government fiscal policy to sustain the 
current economic growth. The economy grew at 7.4 per cent annual rate during the 
first three quarters of 1999,1 but the expansionary macroeconomic policies failed to 
fundamentally alter the trend of the general price levels which have slipped into 
negative growth since October 1997. By September 1999, the retail price index had 
                                                       
1 Note that growth fell to 7 per cent during the July-September period from 8.3 per cent in the first 
quarter and 7.1 per cent in the second quarter. 
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fallen for 24 consecutive months. It was minor 3 per cent during the first nine months 
and the broader consumer price index was minor 1.6 per cent during the same period 
indicating that the government still faces a challenging task in fighting deflation.  
It is likely that the current massive increases in government spending will push the 
growth rate to above 7 per cent in th last quarter of this year, meeting the full year 
growth target of 7 per cent. But the current price deflation could be prolonged if the 
government policies, including various credit schemes (such as housing and consumer 
durables) to boost consumption, imp sit on of taxes on interests from savings and 
increases in wages, fail to boost domestic demand and revive the non-state sector’s 
investment in the next few months. 
 
There were signs of improvement in China’s exports in August and September this 
year. The customs statistics shows that trade surplus in September was US$3.3 billion 
with exports rising 20.2 per cent to US$18.6 billion. It was the third successive month 
exports have risen after falling in the first six months of the year and the first time this 
year that cumulative exports for the year increased over last year. For the full nine 
months to September 30, exports rose 2.1 per cent to US$137 billion and imports 
increased 19.3 per cent to US$117.6 billion leaving a trade surplus of US$19.4 billion. 
 
But, it is still too early to say that the surge of China’s exports in the past couple of 
months represents a turning point for its exports to pick up from the slowing down 
triggered by the East Asian crisis during the past year. Given the current exchange rat  
misalignment vis-à-vis the currencies in other East Asian economies, pressures on 
China’s export sector will certainly continue especially for its exports in the third 
markets. 
 
This less optimistic view on the prospects for China’s exports can also be upported by 
the fact that the inflows of foreign capital continued to decline this year. The total 
utilised foreign capital reached US$24.75 billion in the first eight month in 1999, a 
decline of 9.7 per cent over the same period in 1998. The contracted foreign capital 
was US$25.33 billion during the first eight months, a fall of more than 20 per cent over 
the same period in 1998. Since FDI sustains almost half of China’s total exports, a 
declining trend of the inflow of foreign capital will negatively affec  its export 
potential.  
 
Consequently, discussions have been going on with respect to the future orientation of 
the Chinese economy. That is whether China should turn to its own economy to 
generate growth or continue to reply heavily on the external economy in its next stage 
of development. It is argued that as China moves out of the early stages of 
technological acquisition and adaptation, it may need to make greater domestic efforts 
to keep the process going.  
 
Implications  
 
The price deflation has severe consequences to both the economy and reform program. 
In particular, deflation has two contractionary effects on the economy. One is that 
unexpected deflation raises the real value of debts, thereby transferring resources from 
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debtors to creditors. If debtors have a higher marginal propensity to consume than 
creditors, this transfer reduces spending on goods and services.  
 
The other contractionary effect of deflation is that expected deflation raises real 
interest rates for any given nominal rate, thereby reducing investment and other 
interest-sensitive expenditures.2  A reduced investment implies a slow growth. It is 
devastating since China's economy needs to grow at a high speed to create jobs for 
workers laid off from the restructuring of State-owned nterprises. 
 
Deflation also has the negative effect of delaying consumption. Many Chinese people 
expect lower prices in goods and services and therefore wait to make a purchase. This 
can create a dangerous deflationary spiral: Weak demand might lead to more 
downward pressure on average prices, resulting in further spending delays (Schlevogt 
1999). 
 
What happened to the monetary policies? 
 
There has been a clear trend of declining of money supplies in recent years reflecting a 
weakening of domestic demand for money. The nominal increases in money supplies 
(M2) from 1995 to 1998 were 29.5, 25.3, 17.3 and 15.3 per cent respectively. It 
increased 17.8 and 17.7 per cent in the first two quarters in 1999 respectively.  
 
Why the monetary policies did not work effectively? 
 
(1) When prices are falling, cutting nominal interest rates cannot lower real interest 
enough for the reductions to have stimulating effect on borrowing and investment. In 
case of China, for example, the falling price level makes the real interest rate at around 
6 per cent.  
 
(2) The hardening budget constraints of the commercial banks in recent years have 
made them very cautious in lending particularly refrained them from making loans to 
those inefficient enterprises.  
 
(3) There is a mismatch between the financial (lending) structure and the structure of 
the real economy. The former now consists of both formal and informal systems and 
the latter consists of both the state and non-state sectors. While the non-state sector 
has already accounted for a large proportion of the economy, the dominant formal 
financial sector is still making loans predominantly to the state sector. The informal 
financial sector has been suppressed and unable to provide sufficient funds to the most 
dynamic sector of the economy—the non-state sector especially the private sector. 
 
(4) Further reductions in interest rates will be inconsistent with the current policy of 
holding the RMB exchange rate unchanged since the RMB deposit rates are already 
lower than the US dollar rates. 
 
                                                       
2 Fernald and Babson (1999). 
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(5) There are time lags are associated with monetary policies. It takes approximately 
one year for an interest rate cut to have an impact on output. 
 
Constraints to the implementation of the fiscal policy 
 
There are also some constraints to the implementation of the fiscal policy.
(1) A declining share of the central government’s revenue in total GDP (a fall from 
26.7 per cent in 1979 to 11.5 per cent in 1997) imposes ultimate constraints to the 
expansionary fiscal policy. The current rates of increase in the central government’s 
budget deficits are not sustainable. 
 
(2) There is a potential risk of fiscal crisis even though the current deficit/GDP ratio is 
still within the safe range. 
 
(3) The effectiveness of the fiscal expansion has been, to a certai  extent, offset by the 
increases in taxation revenues collected from both households and productive 
enterprises. 
 
Conclusions 
 
China has the potential to grow in the future, but the key to realise such potential lies 
at the success of its reform particularly in relation to the state-owned sector including 
state-owned banks. Equally important is to find ways of reviving the investment and 
growth of the non-state sector providing the opportunities for transferring resources 
out of the inefficient state-owned sector into the most dynamic non-state sector.  A 
smooth process of such transformation will ensure the social stability and the dynamic 
gains obtained from such a massive scale resource reallocation will provide a sound 
basis for a more sustainable growth of the Chinese economy in the future. 
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